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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
MILLER PONTIAC, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, d/b/a ) 
LAURY MILLER PONTIAC, ) 
) 
' Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Case Noc 16847 
) 
-vs..,, ) 
) 
JANET Sci OSBORNE, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant~ ) 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
· This is an action by plaintiff to recover 
damages as a result of defendant's breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court determined that plaintiff and 
defendant had entered into a conditional sale contract 
and that plaintiff met and comp! ied with the terms of 
the contract. The Court further held that the defend-
ant breached the terms of the contract and rendered 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defend-
ant for plaintiff's damages resulting from the defend-
ant's breach. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent ~eeks aff innation of the 
trial court's Judgment in favor of plaintiff and again-
st defendant-appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant.' s son, Don Osborne., came to 
plaintiff's place of business on March 20, 1978, and 
looked at a Pontiac automobile known as a •Macho". He 
re~urned later the same day with the defendant and the 
defendant entered into a conditional sale contract to 
purchase the vehicle from plaintiff. (R. 98, 105) The 
vehicle which defendant purchased was characterized as 
a "high performance car" (R. 98} and a •hot ca~·· (R. 
19) Defendant's son gave plaintiff a check for the sum 
of $1,500.00 but later stopped payment on the check (R. 
124, 125) due to certain problems with insurance which 
are not relevant to this appeal. Defendant later 
-2-
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signed a .second conditional sale contract with plain-
tiff which is the subject matter of this action. (R. 
127) Defendant and her son took possession of the 
vehicle and gave plaintiff a second check for .the sum 
of $1,SOOoOOe but payment was also stopped on this 
check&> (Re·· 127) 
Defendant's son drove the car for the period 
of approximately March 20 6 1978 to April 15, 1978, 
during which time 3;'500 miles were put on the- odQce 
meter" (Re 127) Defendant's son then testified that 
the engine blew up and he called plaintiff to· ~me tow 
the vehicle away 6) (Re 214) Plaintiff's employees 
performed repairs to the vehicle and ·found that the 
rear wheels were worn quite a bit more than the front 
wheels (Re 151, 152, 170), the clutch plate had heat 
cracks and was excessively burnt (R.. 152, 170), the 
push rods were bent {R .. 143, 144, 171), and the lifters 
were bent { R., 143, 144).. The testimony of plaintiff's 
employees indicated that the damages they found were 
caused by "popping the clutch• {R •. 152). and "excessive 
r.p.m." (R. 170). 
After notifying plaintiff to come and pick up 
the vehicle, defendant's son told plaintiff that he 
-3-
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would take the vehicle back if plaintiff would· put a 
new engine in the vehicle. {R. 218) Plaintiff respon-
ded that repairs would have to be made at the expense 
of def end ant and her son. ( R. 219) Plaintiff's em-
ployees repaired the vehicle and subsequently resold 
the vehicle and brought this action. (R. 149, 150) 
The trial of this matter was ultimately set 
for June 11 ,- 1979, after several continuances. ( R. 
50) On the day of trial, defendant's counsel moved the 
Court for a ·continuance on the basis that his client 
was not present. {R. 92) .However, defendant's counsel 
indicated that he had sent a letter to defendant, 
advising her of the trial setting. { R. 92) No reason 
was given for the defendant's failure to · appear for 
trial. Thereafter, the Court denied defendant's Motion 
and the trial proceeded, with· defendant's counsel 
calling four witnesses, including defendant's son, 
introducing documentary evidence, and arguing the case 
to the Court. The trial court entered Judgment in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GRANTING OR DENYING OF A MOTION 
FOR CONTINUANCE IS LEFT TO THE SOUND 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND 
SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL 
ABSENT A STRONG SHOWING OF ABUSE~ 
Th.e appellant argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it denied appellant 1 s Motion 
for. Continuance and required appellant.' s counsel to 
proceed to ·trial in her absencec Rule 40(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that postponement 
of a trial or proceeding is left to the discretion of 
the Court and should be granted for good cause showne 
This statutory ·principle is reiterated in Griffith v. 
Hammon, 560 Pe2d 1375 (Utah, 1977) wherein the Supreme 
Court held that: 
wA party is not granted a continuance 
as a matter of right, but rather as 
an act of discretion by the court ... • • " 
In that case, the matter was set for trial and the 
defendants promptly objected based upon their counsel's 
inability to appear on the date set because of a pre-
viously scheduled appearance in another District Court 
on the same day. There were no Law & Motion days held 
from the date of filing of the objection and the trial 
date and, subsequently, the objection was never 
-5-
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heard. Defendants did not appear at trial and the 
Court entered the defendants' default and awarded 
Judgment to the plaintiffs. On appeal, this Court 
reversed, finding that the defendants had made timely 
objection, given necessary notice, and had made a 
reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for 
good cause. In the instant case, however, appellant 
made no objection to the trial setting, did not give 
notice, and made no reasonable effort to have the trial 
date changed until the morning of the trial. Even at 
that late hour, appellant's counsel provided no explan-
ation for appellant's absence,· nor did he proffer any 
evidence which would be had should appellant be pre-
sent. In fact, appellant's son was present, was know-
ledgable concerning the facts of the matter, and testi-
fied on behalf of the appellant. 
Appellant relies on the case of Bair as v. 
Johnson, 13 U .2d 269, 373 P. 2d 375 ( 1962), in which 
this Court reversed a denial of a Motion for Contin-
uance. However, the facts of that case are _clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
In Bairas, the plaintiff was confined to a 
hospital following an automobile accident. Trial was 
set for June 28, 1961, and on June 22, plaintiff's 
-6-
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counsel filed a Motion to Vacate the Trial Setting for 
the reason that plaintiff was hospitalized in Califor-
nia and unable to travel to Utah. The Motion was 
accompanied by an .Affidavi_t of plaintiff's attending 
physicianv that plaintiff was not physically able to 
make the trip to Utah at this time,. but that the phys--
ician believ.ed that plaintiff ~al.d be able tO do so in 
approximately-three months. The Motion was argued to 
the Court on June 260 The Court granted a continuance 
to September 20, 1961, and further ordered that should 
the plaintiff be unable to appear for trial at that 
date, his depositon will be taken by his counsel for 
use at the trlar~ Plaintiff was subsequently unable to 
attend the trial on September 20, and his counsel moved 
for a continuancee The Motion was supported by another 
Affidavit from plaintiff's attending physician and one 
from plaintiff's California counsel to the effect that 
it was believed plaintiff could attend the trial up 
until. three days prior to trial"' The ·trial . court 
denied plaintiff's Motion for Continuance, proceeded to 
trial 6 and entered a Judgment of Dismissal with Pre-· 
judice. On appeal, this Court reversed and. remanded 
for a new trial, stating: 
"The reviewing court should not re-
verse the trial court's continuance 
ruling without a showing that the 
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trial court has abused its discre-
tion .. " 
In the instant case, no reason was ever 
provided for the . absence of . the appellant at trial. 
Moreover, appellant's counsel made no Motion for a 
Continuance ·nor gave any Notice thereof until the 
morning of trial.· _Furthermore, appellant's counsel did 
not indicate any evidence which would be forthcoming 
had appellant been present at trial, while in Bairas, 
one of the underlying reasons for the Court's reversal 
was the finding that the plaintiff's testimony was 
essential to his case. Here, the appellant's son was 
present and testified at trial and had as much know-
ledge, if not more, concerning the facts of this mat-
ter, as the appellant. 
The· rule that a Motion for Continuance is in 
the sound discretion of the trial court is followed in 
other jurisdictions. In Security National Bank v. City 
of Olathe, 589 P.2d 589 (Kans., 1979), the Kansas 
Supreme Court on appeal refused to disturb the trial 
court's holding absent a clear sign of abuse. In 
Mccrary v. Bill .McCarty Construction Co., Inc., 591 
P.2d 683 (N.M. App., 1979), the court held that a grant 
-8-
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or denial of a Motion for Continuance is within the 
discretion of the trial court and would only be re-
viewed for an abuse of discretion. Finally, In The 
Matter of Swartzfager, 595 P.2d 508 (O_rec App., 1979), 
the court stated that a Motion for Continuance is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and its action thereon will not be reviewed except for 
a clear abuse of discretion.. That case concerned an 
adoption proceeding and 6 as in Bair as, one party's 
physical inability to attend trial established a iight 
to the continuanceo In the present case there was no 
physical inability to attend trial, no apparent con-
flict of dates, and no other reason given which would 
constitute "good cause" for permitting a continuance. 
In Mahoney v. Linder, 514 P.2d 901, {Ore. App., 1973), 
the court held that a denial of continuance of a hear-
ing on the merits of an adoption petition was not 
error, where the father had failed to keep his at-
torney, who had notice of the hearing, advised of his 
whereabouts. The appellant in this case was aware of 
the proceedings against her and counsel had sufficient 
notice of the trial date. From the Statement of Facts 
contained in appellant's Brief, it appears that her 
counsel was unable to locate her in order to notify her 
of the trial date, although he did send a letter to her 
-9-
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advising her of the trial setting. This would seem to 
be the same fact situation dealt with by the Oregon 
Court in Mahoney and the same rule of law applied, as 
previously enunciated by this Court. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE 
OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTIONS 70A-9-501 A?i4-0 
504, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS 
AMENDED) FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Th~ Utah Supeme Court has long held that it 
will not review a matter raised for the first time on 
appeal. In Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1977), 
the Court held that a matter not ·raised at trial cannot 
be raised on appeal. In that case, the appellant in a 
Motion for a New Trial asserted that the trial court 
had erred in not al lowing a set-off for the value of 
certain improvements. On appeal, this Court held that 
the matter had not been raised at trial and there was 
no abuse of discretion in denying the Motion for a New 
Trial as th~ e~idence had not been newly discovered as 
required under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civir Proced-
ure. In an earlier case, Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 
482 P.2d 702.(1971), this Court stated: 
"Matters neither raised in the plead-
ings nor'put in issue at trial cannot 
be raised for the first time on ao-
peal." • 
-10-
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Appellant first raised the issue of failure 
to comply with Section 70A-9-501 and 504 in her Object~ 
ions to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment submitted after the trial court enter~ 
ed Judgment 'in favor of the respondent. This issue-was 
not set forth in the pleadings nor was it put at issue 
during the trial.. As in Edgar, appellant made her 
objections pursuant to the provisions of ·Rules 59 and 
60" After the entry of Judgment those objections were 
denied by the trial courte Clearly the matter was not 
raised in the trial and thus may not be asserted on 
appeal. 
American States Insurance Co. v. Miller, 
Adams and Crawford, 557 P.2d 756 (Utah, 1976} appears 
dispos i ti ve here. In that case, the trial court gran-
ted defendants Motion to Compel Satisfaction of a 
Default Judgment. The basis of the Motion was an 
alleged agreement entered into between the plaintiff 
and defendants after the Judgment bad been entered, and 
made reference to certain notice provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. This Court found that the 
issue had not been raised prior to trial and that it: 
-11-
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"· •• [C]ame as an afterthought 
and showed up first in the memo--
randum of authorities after change 
of counsel, and in the briefs on 
appeal." 
The Supreme Court cited the provisions of Rule 8(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-ure, which Rule requires 
that affirma.tive defenses be set forth in the plead-
ings. 
Zions First National Ban.le v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 
1031 (Utah, ~1977) is also controlling. In ·that case 
the defendant-appellant argued" that the plaintiff had 
failed to notify him of the time and place of the sale 
of five airplanes used as collateral for a loan. This 
Court found that Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated 
( 19 5 3, as amended) , requires that the secured party 
shall give notice to the debtor~ However 1 the matter 
had not been raised in the· pleadings, there was no 
trial of the issue, nor a showing of any damage or 
disadvantage to the defendant. This Court further 
stated: 
More importantly, the usual rule is 
that failure to so notify does not 
release the debtor from a deficiency 
that may arise1 but upon such failure 
he may get credit for (or recover) 
only for any loss caused by the fail-
ure to so notify. [{Section 70A-9-507, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended)} 
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In the present case, as in Hurst, there was 
no substantial or prejudicial error or any injustice 
resulting from· the failure to notify appellant of the 
salee Even· if appellant could raise this issue on 
appeal~ the :failure to notify is not fatal and would 
not release ·appellant-debtor from the deficiency aris~ 
ing from sale·of the caro In Com:merci~l Credit Corpor-
ation v. Wollgast, 521 Pe2d 1191 (Wash. App., 1974), 
the Court held· that the only pena.l ty for failure to .. 
give proper -.notice of the sale· of collateral is the 
debtor 9 s right ·to recover from the creditor any loss 
caused by the failure to give such notice. The Court 
determined that the failure to give proper notice did 
not deprive the creditor of its right to a Deficiency 
Judgment especially since the sale was made in a com--
mercially reasonable manner and the debtor had failed . 
to establish· ·any damage by virtue of method, manner, 
time and terms of the sale. Similarly, in this case, 
the failure to give notice is irrelevant where the sale 
of the automobile was made in a commercially re~sonable 
manner pursuant to established procedures in the used 
car business*' Appellant makes no allegation that the 
resale of the vehicle was not made in a commercially 
reasonable manner and has made no showing of damages 
resulting from respondent's resale of the automobile. 
-13-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT FOR APPEL-
LANT'S BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
In breach of contract cases, it is the gener-
al rule that the non-breaching party should receive an 
award which will put him in as good a position as he 
would have been had there been no breach of contract. 
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 U.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 
(1969). In order to return respondent to the position 
in which it would have been had there been no breach of 
contract, appellant must pay the damages incurred by 
respondent. 
Appellant cites errors in the trial court's 
award of damages which are not supported by the re-
cord. Appellant alleges in her Brief that the trial 
court awarded respondent lost profits which were not 
lost. However, the testimony at trial indicated that 
respondent would have earned a profit of $829.00 on the 
contract between respondent and appellant had appellant 
not breached the contract. {R. 148). The testimony 
further indicated that the profit received by respond-
ent on the resale of the automobile was the sum of 
$150.00, which was off set by storage costs, interest 
fees, advertising, and other charges. (R. 166). 
-14-
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Appellant also cites error in the award of 
the sum of $100.00 for "expense of processing". How-
ever, the evidence at trial was that this represented 
respondent's expenses incurred in the processing of 
each sale of a vehicle and was incurred in the· sale to 
respondent,as well as in the resale of the vehicle. 
(R., 148). 
Appellant cites error in the award of commis-
sions in the sum of $392001, but appears to be only 
contesting $88.00 of that sum. This amount was earned 
by one of respondent's salesman but was never paid due 
to the breach of the contract by appellant. However, 
it was a damage suffered by respondent due to appel-
lant's breach and, as such, was recoverable.in order to 
place respondent in the position it would have been but 
for the breach of contract. 
Appellant cites error in the award of profit 
from a service contract in the sum of $260. 00 and 
alleges that the record is that only 35% of this would 
have been lost had the second purchaser on resale not 
taken a service contract. The fact that a subsequent 
purchaser on resale elected to purchase a service 
contract has no bearing on the damages suffered by the 
respondent due to appellant's breach of contract. 
Respondent earned a new prof it on a service contract on 
-15-
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that sale which is irrelevant to the issue of damages 
in this case. 
Finally, appellant complains of the trial 
court's award of the sum of $1,018.56 for repairs 
respondent made to the vehicle, alleging that the cost 
of those repairs to respondent was only the sum of 
$778.91Q Appellant ignores the fact that, but for the 
breach of contract, appellant would have paid the 
retail. cost of the repairs in the sum of $1 , 018. 56 and 
this is the amount of damages suffered by respondent. 
The trial court heard the evidence and care-
fully considered the proper amount of damages to be 
awarded to respondent for appellant's breach of the 
conditional sale contract and did not abuse its dis-
cretion in awarding Judgment to the respondent here-
in. There is sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's decision and this Court should not disturb the 
amount of the Judgment. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT COULD NOT PROPERLY REVOKE 
HER ACCEPTANCE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
UNDER SECTION 70A-2-608, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED) OR 
RESCIND THE CONTRACT WHERE THERE 
WAS NO DEFECT IN THE AUTOMOBILE. 
-16-
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Appellant's assertion .is correct that Utah 
law allows the purchaser of defective goods to revoke 
acceptance or rescind a contract where a defect exists 
and is not discovered at the ·time of sale., However, 
this provision is based on the premise that the buyer 
receives an item whose defect substantially impairs its 
valueQ In other words, the buyer may revoke acceptance 
within a reasonable time after discovering a defect and 
before any substantial change in the goods occurs which 
is not caused by the defect.. In the present case, 
there was no unknown or discoverable defect in the 
automobile. · Rather, it suffered a substantial change 
in condition as a result of the abusive driving· habits 
of appellant's son.. Appellant asserts that there was 
apparently some defect in the car which caused its 
demise other than the d~11ages caused by the driver c 
The appellant offers no explanation as to what the 
"other defect" might have been and offers no proof as 
to its existence. On the c.ontrary, testimony at the 
trial clearly indicated that the untimely demise of the 
automobile engine resulted from ·bad driving prac-
tices. (R. 169 - 176) 
The value of the car was substantially im-
paired not by any hidden defect but by its use in the 
three weeks following the agreement to purchase. 
-17-
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Appellant's son, the principal driver of the automo-
bile, had driven the car some 3,500 miles between March 
20 and April 15 of 1978. (R. 217) Upon discovering 
that the automobile would no longer run, appellant's 
son abandoned it. Respondent was forced to pick up the 
car, return it to the garage, and attempt to repair 
it. Thereafter, appellant's son offered to resume 
ownership or resume the contract if respondent would 
agree to put a new engine in the car at no expense to 
appellant. Respondent was under no obligation to 
repair the automobile and violated no warranty duty in 
refusing to repair or replace an engine that was of fit 
and merchantable quality at the time of sale. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWAR-
DED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPON-
DENT. 
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to 
respondent on the basis of the contract between the 
parties which provided for an award of attorney's fees 
upon a breach of contract. Appellant has cited this as 
error but seems to argue that the award of attorney's 
fees is improper only because appellant should have 
prevailed on the merits. However, appellant did not 
prevail on the merits, the trial court found in favor 
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of respondent, and the award of attorney's fees was 
based on the provisions of the contract between the 
parties. 
The case of Fullmer v. Blood,. 546 P.2d 606 
(Utah, 1976), is not applicable to the instant case, 
In Fullmer, the trial court awarded Judgment to plain-
tiffs, although ruling against plaintiffs on one of the 
main issues -involved in the lawsuit. The trial court 
then declined to award attorney's fees to either party, 
and both parties appealed. This Court· held that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion in failing to 
award attorney's fees, where each party had justifica-
tion for making their respective claims to the real 
property involved, and each party prevailed on one or 
more issues at trial Cl The facts of the instant case 
are clearly distinguishable in that the appellant 
failed to prevail on any issue at trial and bad no 
reasonable justification for her breach of the contract 
between the parties, other than her reluctance to pay . 
for the automobile after her son had damaged it. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Rule 40B of. the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a grant or denial of a Motion for Contin-
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uance is discretionary with .the trial court and can be 
granted only where good cause is shown. In the present 
case, the trial court exercised its discretion to deny 
the Motion. The denial was reasonable and there was no 
substantial injustice to appellant. Appellant may not 
raise the issue of failure to comply with the notice 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code on appeal 
where she failed to raise that issue in her pleadings 
or during trial. Further, the failure to notify appel-
lant of the sale does not release the debtor from 
damages for the breach of contract and as appellant 
suffered no loss through failure to notify 1 there is no 
reason to overturn the Judgment. Damages awarded to 
the respondent consisted of full and fair relief for 
breach of the contract calculated to return-respondent 
to the position in which it would have been had appel-
lant not breached the agreemenL Appellant may not 
revoke acceptance of the automobile or rescind the 
contract where there was no defect in the automobile. 
The trial court's Judgment was proper and its award of 
attorney's fees to the respondent was justified. 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day 
of-----~---.-.... (----' 1980. 
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THOMAS N. ARNETT, 
of and for 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P •• 
32 Exchange Place, 
Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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I hereby declare that I delivered two copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent in Case No. 16847, 
this 30th day of May, 1980, to David s. Dolowitz, 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Attorney for Appellant, 79 
South State Street, P .. o .. Box 11898, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 841470 
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